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MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT
OF 1968: HOW FAR HAVE WE COME?
by Wayne L. Friesner
The man who dons the uniform of his country today does not disregard
his right to fair treatment under law. The first great step came in 1950.
It was then that our servicemen and women were given the Uniform Code
of Military Justice-the most sweeping development in military law in all
our history. When President Harry Truman signed it into life, he was able
to say that 'the democratic ideal of equality is further advanced.' Today we
advance again. The Military Justice Act of 1968, which we sign now, will
stand proudly next to the 1950 law. It expands the concept of fairness by
creating an independent court system within the military, free from com-
mand pressures and control. It enlarges the rights of the individual soldier by
giving him trained legal defense when he is tried by special court-martial.
It makes many other changes to streamline the system, and to safeguard the
serviceman. We have always prided ourselves on giving our men and women
in uniform excellent medical service, superb training, the best equipment.
Now, with this bill, we are going to give him first-class legal service as well.
Is/ LYNDON B. JOHNSON
(Remarks on signing the Military
Justice Act of 1968, October 24, 1968.)
With these remarks, President Johnson signed into effect the first ma-
jor revision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice since its adoption in
1950. In 1953, the United States Supreme Court, in Burns v. Wilson,'
held that: "The military courts, like the state courts, have the same re-
sponsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation
of his constitutional rights."' These two pronouncements provide impetus
to examine the extent to which the military courts are carrying out their
responsibility to protect the individual serviceman from violations of his
constitutional rights in an environment which he entered, often invol-
untarily, and which operates under rules which are foreign to him. This
is the issue which is to be explored in this Comment through a survey of
the military court system, an examination of United States Supreme Court
opinions which have substantially enlarged the substantive and procedural
rights of the civilian defendant in criminal prosecutions, and the decisions
of the United States Court of Military Appeals which have implemented,
limited or expanded the Supreme Court decisions. When appropriate,
there will be an examination of the Military Justice Act of 1968,' which
codified many reform proposals" for the military justice system and its
1346 U.S. 137 (1953).
2 id. at 142.
'Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (Oct. 24, 1968). This Act will be codified in Title 10,
U.S.C., Chapter 47 as the Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter cited as Art. -, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § - (1964) or (as amended 1968) when appropriate].
'Previous attempts to revise the Uniform Code of Military Justice culminated with the intro-
duction in the Senate of the Military Justice Act of 1967 (S. 2009). 113 CoNc. REc. 58838
(daily ed. June 26, 1967). The only previous important revision of the Military Code had occurred
in 1961 when Article 15 (the non-judicial punishment provision) was expanded to give the com-
manding officer the disciplinary powers equivalent to the judicial powers he had as the summary
court-martial officer. S. 2009 did not go so far as to abolish completely the summary court-martial.
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., the sponsor of the bill, felt that it should be abolished, however, and
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probable impact in the military courts' responsibilities to the servicemen
in the armed forces.
I. THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
The jurisdiction of the military judicial system is limited by the Su-
preme Court's holding in O'Callahan v. Parker' to crimes that are "service-
connected." ' Punishment for those crimes is meted out principally through
one of four modes of judicial machinery. First, a commanding officer
is given the power to impose one or more of a large number of punish-
ments referred to commonly as "non-judicial" or "Article 15" punish-
ments. These punishments are primarily disciplinary actions, such as lim-
ited correctional custody, forfeiture of a limited amount of pay, reduc-
tion of one grade, extra duties, area restrictions and limited detention.' A
serviceman is not entitled to counsel at this proceeding, but does have the
right, prior to imposition of punishment, to demand trial by court-martial
in lieu of non-judicial punishment.
Formal military justice is involved in the other three levels of courts-
martial, the first being the summary court-martial! This court consists
of one commissioned officer' and may generally issue sentences up to one
month in confinement or hard labor without confinement for a period up
to 45 days.1"
A second level of courts-martial which involves formal military justice
is the intermediate or special court-martial." The jurisdiction of this court
is limited to non-capital offenses and it may impose as punishment a max-
imum sentence of six months in confinement, hard labor without con-
finement for a period up to three months and a bad conduct discharge."
A limitation on the special court's jurisdiction is the requirement that a
bad conduct discharge can only be adjudged when a complete record is
said that "[t]he summary court is an inferior court in concept, procedure, and in the quality of
justice it dispenses." 113 CONG. REC. at S8839. Many provisions of the Military Justice Act of
1967 were substantially adopted by Congress in the Military Justice Act of 1968. S. 2009 was an
omnibus bill which contained five separate titles: Title I contained a code of procedure for the
consideration and issuance of administrative discharge boards; Title II would have created a separate
Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps; Title III would have altered the procedure of the Military
Code; Title IV would have transferred the board of review, the intermediate appellate reviewing
body, from an administrative board to a formal court; and Title V would consolidate the existing
separate Boards for the Correction of Records. For an excellent discussion of S. 2009 and its possi-
ble impact, see Haight, The Proposed Military Justice Act of 1967: First Class Legislation for
"Second Class" Citizens, 72 DICK. L. REV. 92 (1967).
Titles I and V are the only portions of the omnibus bill that are not presently the law. In
recommending the Military Justice Act of 1968 to the Senate, Senator Ervin commented on the
absence of the reform of the administrative discharge boards from the bill and indicated, after
conferences with Department of Defense representatives, "that it may be possible to obtain some
desired reforms in respect to administrative discharge boards next year without opposition." 114
CONG. REC. S12028 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1968).
537 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 2, 1969).
Id. at 4469. The Court in this case did not define in any manner what "service-connected"
means.
7Art. 15, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).
8 Art. 20, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964).
9 Art. 16(3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 816(3) (1964).
"
0Art. 20, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964).




made. The Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter referred to as
the Code] also provides that in each special court-martial, the conven-
ing authority should "detail trial counsel and defense counsel""3 as he
deems appropriate.
The highest court-martial of the military system is the general court-
martial." The jurisdiction of this court extends to all acts punishable by
the Code and any punishment not forbidden by the Code including the
death penalty." Trial counsel and defense counsel must both be lawyers
who have been certified by the Judge Advocate General of the accused's
armed service to perform such duties."
The review procedure in the armed forces is unique because of the au-
tomatic review afforded in certain cases, and also because of the principle
that at each reviewing stage, the sentence can be affirmed, or lowered, but
can never be increased." After the court-martial is concluded, the record
of each case is sent to the authority who originally convened the court.'
Every general court-martial record receives an automatic review by the
convening authority's staff judge advocate for his legal opinion."' This au-
tomatic review by a judge advocate officer is also given to any special
court-martial that adjudges a bad conduct discharge." After this review,
and if the convening authority approves the sentence, the record is for-
warded to the Judge Advocate General of the service of which the accused
was a member." There, every approved sentence that "affects a general or
flag officer or extends to death, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet,
or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement
for one year or more"" must be reviewed by a statutory three-man board
of review."
The highest court in the military system is the Court of Military Ap-
peals, [hereinafter referred to as CMA] which is composed of three ci-
vilian judges appointed by the President' for a fifteen-year term.' This
court automatically reviews any sentence affecting a general or flag officer
or one that includes a death penalty." Automatic review is given any case
"Art. 27(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 827(a) (1964). Prior to the Military Justice Act of 1968,
"counsel" as used here did not mean a legally qualified lawyer or an officer of the Judge Advocate
General Corps. United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963). However, the
Code provided that if the trial counsel (prosecutor) was a lawyer, then the defense counsel had
to be one also. Art. 27(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1964). For the effect of the Military
Justice Act of 1968, see notes 127-29 infra, and accompanying text.
4Art. 16(l), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. S 816(1) (1964).
5Art. 18, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1964).
"6Art. 27(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 827(b) (1964).
17Art. 62(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 862(b) (1964).
"Art. 60, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 860 (1964). The Military Justice Act of 1968 has extended
the right of an accused to petition for a new trial in all cases, not just in those where the sentence
was death, dismissal, a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge or confinement for one year or more.
Also, the time allowed for appeal has been extended from one to two years. Art. 73, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 873 (as amended 1968).
1"Art. 61, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. S 861 (1964).
"0Art. 65(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 865(b) (1964).
'Art. 65, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 865 (1964).
2Art. 66(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (1964).
2Art. 66(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (1964).
24 Art. 67(a) (1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 5 867(a) (1) (1964).
2Art. 67(a) (2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 5 867(a) (2) (1964).
"6Art. 67(b)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(b)(1) (1964).
[Vol. 23
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which a board of review has completed and which the Judge Advocate
General orders sent to the court for review." In addition, in any other
case the accused may petition the court for review.
II. MILITARY-CIVILIAN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 1968
When a man enters the armed forces, he loses many freedoms which he
would consider "rights" in civilian life. Among these is his freedom to live
where he pleases, 8 his freedom to tell off his boss or complain about con-
ditions when he pleases, ° his freedom to question instructions given him
by a superior,"' and his freedom to choose not to risk his life for his em-
ployer.2 The loss of these rights is intrinsic to the military service and be-
cause of military exigencies is necessary for the system to work effectively.
But when a serviceman is accused of a crime, what constitutional protec-
tions can he expect to receive in the military judiciary?
The CMA stated in United States v. Tempia2 that Burns v. Wilson"'
was "an unequivocal holding by the Supreme Court that the protections
of the Constitution are available to servicemen in military trials," 2 and
that the constitutional safeguards are applicable to military trials except
"as they are made inapplicable either expressly or by necessary implica-
tion. ' In Miranda v. Arizona,s" the Supreme Court laid down the require-
ment that prior to any interrogation by police officials, the accused "must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 8 These rights can
be waived but if at any time during the interrogation the accused indi-
cates that "he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there
can be no further questioning."" In Tempia the CMA held that the rules
enunciated in Miranda "are to govern all criminal interrogations by Fed-
eral or State authorities, military or civilian, if resulting statements are to
be used in trials commencing on and after June 13, 1966. "40 Since Tempia,
2 7 Art. 67(b)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(b)(2) (1964).28 Art. 67(b)(3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. S 867(b)(3) (1964).
20 Possibly punishable as desertion under Art. 85, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1964).
S"Possibly punishable as conspiracy under Art. 81, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 881 (1964), and as
mutiny under Art. 94, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964).
" Possibly punishable as contempt towards officials under Art. 88, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 888
(1964); disrespect toward superior commissioned oflficer under Art. 89, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 889
(1964); willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer under Art. 90, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 890
(1964); insubordinate conduct towards a warrant, noncommissioned or petty officer under Art. 91,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 891 (1964); and failure to obey an order or regulation under Art. 92, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 892 (1964).
as See generally O'Malley, Mapp, Miranda, and the Accused, 4 TRIAL 10 (Feb./March 1968).
22 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).4 346 U.S. 137 (1953). See note I supra, and accompanying text.
as United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 634, 37 C.M.R. 249, 254 (1967).
28 Id. The most common example of a constitutional right not being generally available is the
right of free speech. See Brown, Must the Soldier Be a Silent Member of Our Society?, 43 M..
L. REV. 71 (1969).
27 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'lid. at 444.
" Id. at 44 5.
40 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 635, 37 C.M.R. at 255.
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the CMA has resolved many of the procedural problems' raised by Miran-
da and has applied the requirements of Miranda-Tempia to actual fact
situations."
Rights of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The protections afforded
an accused by the fourth and fifth amendments overlap in many con-
texts. Thus, for instance, the taking of blood from an unconscious per-
son has been attacked as an unreasonable search and seizure of his person
in violation of the fourth amendment and also as being in violation of
the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment."3 This overlap war-
rants treatment of the rights guaranteed by these amendments in one sec-
tion.
The fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not have an exact statutory counterpart in the Code,' but
the issue is covered in the Manual for Courts-Martial [hereinafter referred
to as the Manual]. Prior to 1969, the Manual provided examples of five
types of searches considered legal: (1) those conducted under the author-
ity of a lawful search warrant; (2) a search of the person, the clothes he
is wearing and the property in his immediate possession or control inci-
dent to a lawful arrest; (3) a search to prevent the removal or disposal of
criminal goods; (4) a search made with the consent of the owner of the
property; and (5) a search authorized by a commanding officer.' Until
the CMA's decision in United States v. Brown 4  in 1959, probable cause
to search was required in the first four examples, while the fifth, the com-
4' Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), held that Miranda would apply only to cases
commenced after June 13, 1966. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 635, 37 C.M.R. at
255, also held that Miranda would be applied retroactively in the military courts to June 13, 1966.
United States v. Swift, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 227, 38 C.M.R. 25 (1967), held that cases tried before that
date would be governed not by Miranda, but rather by the rules then in effect under United States
v. Wimberly, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966). United States v. Bosley, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
350, 38 C.M.R. 148 (1968) is authority for the rule that it is the date of trial and not the date
of confession which governs as to the applicability of the June 13, 1966 date. United States v.
Westmove, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 406, 38 C.M.R. 204 (1968) held that the standards of proof for the
waiver of a constitutional right as set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), would be
applied to in-custody interrogations in the military. See Wasinger, The Doctrine of Waiver, 39
MYL. L. REV. 85 (1968). United States v. Hardy, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 37 C.M.R. 364 (1967),
held that the burden of proving a waiver by the accused rests with the government.
42 See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 39, 37 C.M.R. 303 (1967) (warning of
art. 31 rights and that the accused was entitled to "consult with legal counsel if you so desire"
held insufficient in the absence of a warning as to the right to appointed counsel); United States
v. McCauley, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 81, 37 C.M.R. 345 (1967) (failure to warn accused of his right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, rendered statements made inadmissible);
United States v. Bollons, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 253, 38 C.M.R. 51 (1967) (when accused states that "I
don't want to say anything to incriminate myself," the questioning must cease); United States v.
Solomon, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 262, 38 C.M.R. 60 (1967) (after a request for counsel, the questioning
must cease).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
44 Art. 7(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 807(b) (1964), requires that: "Any person authorized under
regulations governing the armed forces to apprehend persons subject to this chapter or to trial
thereunder may do so upon reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the
person apprehended committed it." (Emphasis added.) See Cobbs & Warren, Military Searches and
Seizures, 1 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1958).
4"United States Dep't of Defense, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 1951, para. 152
[hereinafter referred to as the Manual and cited as MCM 1951 (or 1969 where appropriate), para.
-]. Because of the enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968, the Manual will be revised
again effective Aug. 1, 1969, the same date that the Act will become effective.
41 10 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 28 C.M.R. 48 (1959).
[Vol. 23
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manding officer's search of government owned or controlled property, did
not require probable cause. However, in Brown, the CMA extended the
probable cause requirement to include commanding officers' searches. The
court recognized the wide discretion given to commanders to authorize a
search, but held that in this instance "reasonable or probable cause was
clearly lacking for both the apprehension and the search and, although the
military permits certain deviation from civilian practice in the procedures
for initiating a search, the substantive rights of the individual and the
necessity that probable cause exist therefor remain the same. Unreasonable
searches and seizures will not be tolerated." 7 The officer who conducted
the search acted on "mere suspicion" and "[t]he search was general and
exploratory in nature and wholly lacking in reasonable cause. '"" By this
holding, the court in effect raised the military procedure to that in the
civilian system. 9
Congress in the Military Justice Act of 1968 did nothing to add to or
detract from the status of military law on the search and seizure or prob-
able cause requirements of the fourth amendment. However, the drafters
of the new Manual now present ° a very modern and definitive statement
as to what is a "lawful search"'" and what is "probable cause."" The Man-
ual, in effectively adopting much prior federal and military law, is not
expected to effect a change in military law, but rather consolidates the
law in a more accessible manner so that the requirements of the fourth
amendment will be more fully met.
The fifth amendment gives to a civilian the right of a grand jury in-
dictment or presentment before he can be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime. Cases that arise in the armed forces are ex-
pressly excepted from the operation of this part of the amendment."
41Id. at 488, 28 C.M.R. at 54.
18id. at 489, 28 C.M.R. at 55.
" For an excellent discussion of search and seizure and probable cause, see Hamel, Military Search
and Seizure-Probable Cause Requirement, 39 MIL. L. REV. 41 (1968).
'OMCM 1969, para. 152.
" The examples given in the old Manual were retained, though more were added to the "search
incident to a lawful arrest" example and the probable cause requirement of United States v. Brown
was set forth explicitly for all searches. In addition, two more lawful searches were added; a search
incident to a lawful hot pursuit of a person, and a search of open fields or woodlands with or
without the consent of the owner or tenant.
"The Manual specifically provides that:
Probable cause for ordering a search exists when there is reason to believe that items
of the kind indicated above as being properly the subject of a search are located in
the place or on the person to be searched. Such a reasonable belief may be based on
information which the authority requesting permission to search has received from
another if the authority ordering the search has been apprised of some of the under-
lying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the items in question
were where he claimed they were and some of the underlying circumstances from
which the authority requesting permission to search concluded that the informant,
whose identity need not be disclosed, was credible or his information reliable.
MCM 1969, para. 152.
" "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia when in actual service or in time of war or public danger .... " U.S. CoNsa.
amend. V. The words "when in actual service in time of war or public danger," refer only to
the "Militia." All persons in the military or naval service of the United States, are subject to the
military law. Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895); Ex Parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1882). See
also Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Kahn v. Ander-
son, 255 U.S. 1 (1921). But see O'Callahan v. Parker, 37 U.S.L.W. 4464 (U.S. June 2, 1969).
1969]
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Although the Constitution does not require that grand jury action be
available prior to military prosecution, Articles 32 and 34 of the Code re-
quire that "[n]o charge or specification may be referred to a general
court-martial for trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all
the matters set forth therein has been made." ' This is essentially the func-
tion of the civilian grand jury. However, the Article 32 investigation, as
opposed to the grand jury procedure or the preliminary hearing under the
federal rules,"5 affords the military accused much greater guarantees of
procedural and substantive due process.'
Initially the military accused must be advised of the charges against
him and his right to be represented by counsel, either retained or ap-
pointed at the hearing." He is also given the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses against him and to present any evidence on his own behalf either
in defense or mitigation."8 The investigating officer is required to make
available all witnesses requested by the accused and to prepare a statement
(a copy of which is to be given to the accused) of the substance of all
testimony taken on both sides to accompany his recommendation as to the
charges. This military procedure of requiring an investigation into the
truth of the matters in the charge prior to a court-martial gives the ac-
cused greater protections and rights than a civilian receives from the
grand jury procedure, where few if any protections are available against
unwarranted or arbitrary action, or the federal preliminary hearings
where substantial discovery rights are doubtfully available."
The fifth amendment's right against self-incrimination, made appli-
cable to the states by the 1964 decision in Malloy v. Hogan," has been
protected in the military by the Code 1 since it was adopted in 1950. It
provides in Article 31 that:
No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any state-
ment from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first in-
forming him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does
not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused
or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence
against him in a trial by court-martial."2
As may be seen by comparing this section with the requirements of Mi-
54Art. 32(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832(a) (1964) further provides that: "This investigation
shall include inquiry as to the truth of the matter set forth in the charges, consideration of the
form of charges, and a recommendation as to the disposition which should be made of the case
in the interest of justice and discipline."55 Compare arts. 30, 32, 33, 34, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 830, 832, 833, 834 (1964) with FED.
R. CRIM. P. 3-9. See also Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1944).5 0Art. 32(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832(b) (1964).
" In Tempia it was held that this "counsel" must be a lawyer.
"The impact of the right of cross-examining witnesses is made more important by the fact
that testimony recorded verbatim during the hearing may be used at the trial if the witness later
becomes unavailable. See United States v. Obligacion, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 36, 37 C.M.R. 300 (1967);
United States v. Nichols, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 23 C.M.R. 343 (1957).
59 See notes 53-54 supra.
10378 U.S. 1 (1964).
ilArt. 31(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (a) (1964) provides that: "No person subject to this
chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to
which may tend to incriminate him."6 2 Art. 31(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 5 831(b) (1964).
[Vol. 23
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randa,"6 the military, prior to Malloy and Miranda, afforded self-incrim-
ination protection superior to and as effective as any such protection pro-
vided by the states. The Miranda requirement missing in Article 31 is that
relating to the individual's right to consult with counsel, either retained
or appointed. However, the CMA has previously held that when an ac-
cused requests counsel after having been given his Article 31 warnings, a
refusal by the interrogator to afford him the opportunity to consult with
counsel is reversible error." When the CMA adopted Miranda in Tempia,
this statutory deficiency was corrected by judicial interpretation5 so that
currently the military complies with at least all of the requirements of
the Supreme Court as to self-incrimination.
Differences do exist between what is required in civilian courts as pro-
tection against self-incrimination and what is required in the military
judiciary. Shortly after Miranda, the Supreme Court held in Schmerber
v. California," that the privilege against self-incrimination "protects an
accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or other-
wise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in ques-
tion in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.""' This hold-
ing was based on facts indicating that the accused had objected to the
withdrawal of the blood by a medical doctor at the direction of a police
officer. Prior to Schinerber, the CMA in United States v. Musguire"s had
held that an order to submit to a "blood alcohol test" was not a legal
order because the word "statement" in Article 31 "includes both verbal
utterances and actions,"'" and consequently this order, if carried fore-
ward by action on the accused's part, would be a self-incriminating
statement within the meaning of Article 31. The court further held that
"Article 31 is wider in scope than the fifth amendment."'" The court
held as inapplicable the Supreme Court's holding in Breithaupt v. Abram"
that the admission into evidence of a blood sample taken from an uncon-
scious accused did not deprive him of his constitutional rights insofar as
they applied to state criminal prosecutions because Musguire was not a
"state" case. In United States v. Miller," the CMA held that results of a
blood test taken from the unconscious accused would be admissible if there
was "no 'nexus' between the doctor and enforcement agents or accused's
e Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444 (1966). See also notes 36-40 supra, and accompanying
text.
64United States v. Rose, 8 U.S.M.C.A. 441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957); United States v. Gunnels,
8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
' It is a curious anomaly that in revising the Code in the Military Justice Act of 1968, Congress
did not include a provision amending art. 31 (b) so that it would conform to Miranda-Tempia. The
amendment would have been simply a matter of form, yet its omission could give rise to criticism
of military justice. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 37 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 2, 1969). See also
MCM 1969, para. 34, which makes the "counsel" provision of art. 32 applicable to an art. 31 (b)
warning.
66384 U.S. 757 (1966).
'Id. at 761.
669 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 25 C.M.R. 329 (1958).
69id. at 68, 25 C.M.R. at 330.
7 Id.
" 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
7 15 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 35 C.M.R. 292 (1965).
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superiors who may be interested in those results for the purpose of possible
prosecution.""3 Thus, the right against self-incrimination is violated in the
military when the results of blood tests are used unless there is a showing
that the tests were taken solely for medical diagnostic purposes, while in
the civilian area the results of such tests are admissible."
In Gilbert v. California," the Supreme Court followed the Schinerber
rule and held that the admission of handwriting exemplars over the ob-
jection of the accused did not violate the self-incrimination clause be-
cause "[a] mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of
what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical
characteristic outside its protection . . . .No claim is made that the con-
tent of the exemplars was testimonial or communicative matter.""0 Prior
to Gilbert, the CMA in United States v. Minnifield" had held, in accord
with the reasoning of Musguire, that "an accused's handwriting exemplar
is equated to a 'statement' as that term is found in Article 31. It follows,
therefore, that in order to be admissible, it must be shown that the pro-
visions of Article 31 have been fully complied with.""0 After Gilbert an
attack was made in United States v. White" that Gilbert overruled Min-
nifield. The CMA, however, reaffirmed Minnifield, pointing out the dis-
tinction of Musguire that Article 31 is broader than the fifth amend-
ment and that this is a statutory right and not a constitutional right.
"Consequently," the court concluded, "we adhere to Minnifield, and re-
affirm the rule that an accused must be apprised of his rights under Article
31, before he can be asked for samples of his handwriting."" This statu-
tory right does not apply when evidence, later used in a court-martial, is
obtained by a civilian investigator acting independently of the military
authorities."1 However, the Article 31 requirements would extend to the
civilian investigator when (1) the scope and character of the cooperative
efforts demonstrate that the two investigations merged into an indivisible
entity, or (2) when the civilian investigator acts in furtherance of the
military investigation or in any sense as an instrument of the military.'
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment has an equivalent
provision in the Code. However, Article 44 provides that "[n]o person
may, without his consent, be tried a second time for the same offense."'"
In United States v. Waldron,s" the CMA cited the fifth amendment and
Article 44 as synonymously standing for a prohibition against placing the
accused in double jeopardy and held that "if an accused is brought to
trial before a court-martial and the proceedings are terminated after
'3 Id. at 321, 35 C.M.R. at 293.
'4Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
7' 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
71 Id. at 266.
779 U.S.C.M.A. 373, 26 C.M.R. 153 (1958).
78 Id. at 379, 26 C.M.R. at 159.
7' 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 (1967).
s0Id. at 216, 38 C.M.R. at 14.
88 United States v. Penn, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 194, 39 C.M.R. 194 (1969). See also United States v.
Holcomb, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 202, 39 C.M.R. 202 (1969).
82 United States v. Penn, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 194, 39 C.M.R. 194 (1969).83Art. 44(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1964).
84 1 U.S,C.M.A. 628, 36 C.M.R. 126 (1966).
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jeopardy attaches, but without legal justification, the accused is protected
against another trial for the same offenses." 5 Thus, the court adopted the
constitutional protections of the fifth amendment by the statutory pro-
tections afforded under Article 44.
The interplay of the fourth and fifth amendments and their role in
the military is further illustrated by United States v. Whisenhant." In
that case, the CMA reversed a prior decision,"1 relying on the Supreme
Court's rejection in Warden v. Hayden8 of the "mere evidence rule"
under the fourth amendment's search and seizure provision. 9 The CMA
further relied on the Schmerber test and said that the evidence (items of
clothing) "[was] neither 'testimonial' nor 'communicative' in nature;
hence their introduction did not compel the accused to become a witness
against himself in violation of the fifth amendment.""8
Rights of the Sixth Amendment. Article 10 of the Code requires that
when an accused is placed in arrest or confinement, "immediate steps"
shall be taken to try him or to dismiss the charges and release him.8" Ar-
ticle 33 requires that if a person is held for trial by general court-martial,
charges shall be forwarded to the officer exercising general court-martial
jurisdiction within eight days after the accused is ordered into arrest or
confinement." These two articles provide for the serviceman the military
equivalent of a right to a speedy trial under the first clause of the sixth
amendment. While the CIA has said that trials by court-martial are not
governed per se by the sixth amendment,"a the case law that has devel-
oped in the military" has been to the effect that these two articles provide
at least the equivalent of the constitutional requirement, as well as the
requirement of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that there be no
"unnecessary delay.""
In United States v. Jacoby," the CMA overruled previous decisions"'
of the court and held that the sixth amendment right of confrontation
required that Article 49 of the Code be read to require "that the accused
be afforded the opportunity (although he may choose knowingly to waive
it thereafter) to be present with his counsel at the taking of written depo-
85 Id. at 630, 36 C.M.R. at 128. See also Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Kates,
Former Jeopardy-A Comparison of the Military and Civilian Right, 15 MIL. L. REv. 51 (1962).
8 17 U.S.C.M.A. 117, 37 C.M.R. 381 (1967).
87United States v. Vierra, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 260 (1963).
83987 U.S. 294 (1967).
"9 See Davis, The "Mere Evidence" Rule in Search and Seizure, 35 MIL. L. REV. 101 (1967).
90 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 121, 37 C.M.R. at 385.
9' Art. 10, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1964).
9 Art. 33, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 833 (1964).
"3United States v. Lamphere, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 580, 37 C.M.R. 200 (1967).
"4United States v. Brown, 10 U*S.C.M.A. 498, 28 C.M.R. 64 (1959); United States v. Wilson,
10 U.S.C.M.A. 398, 27 C.M.R. 472 (1959); United States v. Wilson, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 337, 27
C.M.R. 411 (1959); United States v. Callahan, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 156, 27 C.M.R. 230 (1959); United
States v. Hounshell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 21 C.M.R. 129 (1956).
' Fuo. R. CRIM. P. 5, 48 provide for dismissal if there is unnecessary delay in bringing the
defendant to trial.
98 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
7United States v. Parrish, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 337, 22 C.M.R. 127 (1956); United States v. Sutton,
3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 11 C.M.R. 220 (1953).
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sitions."" The reliance by the CMA on Burns v. Wilson"9 in reaching this
seems to have brought the military accused within the sixth amendment's
guarantee of the right to personally confront the witnesses against him.'0
Criticism of the military in the area of sixth amendment rights is
aimed primarily at the "impartial jury" requirement of that amendment
and specifically at Article 25 of the Code. This article provides in effect
that when an enlisted man is to be tried by either a special or general
court-martial and he requests in writing that enlisted members serve on
the court, at least one-third of the members must be enlisted men.' Two
issues are critically posed: (1) why should not the enlisted man be entitled
to a jury completely of his peers, i.e., all enlisted men; and (2) there is no
control over the discretion of the convening authority who appoints mem-
bers of the court. If an enlisted man requests the "enlisted-man court,"
what is to prevent the convening authority... from appointing career non-
commissioned officers who will invariably vote with officers of the court,
thus having the effect, in many instances, of making the court far from
"impartial." Another general point of difference between the civilian jury
system and the military system is that in the military, the number of
members of the court can vary from not less than three0 ' to any number
not less than five,'04 while the normal civilian criminal jury consists of
twelve members. Also in the military, it takes only two-thirds of the
members present to convict an accused.' However, unanimity is required
if the crime is capital" and a three-fourths vote is required if the sentence
is life imprisonment or confinement for a period in excess of ten years."'
The Manual further provides that "[a] finding of not guilty results as to
any specification or charge if no other valid finding is reached thereon
.... ,,1This has led many to erroneously"' conclude that there can be
no "hung jury" in the military."' The new Manual has recognized the
need for a procedure to resolve the problem of a "hung jury" by provid-
ing for a reballoting procedure. . similar to that required by the CMA in
98 11 U.S.C.M.A. at 433, 29 C.M.R. at 249.
99 346 U.S. 137 (1953). See notes 31-34 supra, and accompanying text.
00 The CMA also relied on two other Supreme Court cases: Motes v. United States, 178 U.S.
458 (1900) and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). See also Donahue, Former Testi-
mony, 31 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1966). See MCM 1969, para. 146b, for a discussion of former testimony
and the right of confrontation.
10' Art. 25(c)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1) (1964).
02 The issue of control by the convening authority over the military judicial proceeding, the
so-called "command influence," is treated at notes 168-82 infra, and accompanying text.
O'Art. 16(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 5 816(2) (1964) (special courts-martial).
504Art. 16(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 5 816(1) (1964) (general courts-martial).
"'Arts. 52(a)(2), (b) (3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 55 852(a) (2), (b)(3) (1964).
I"Arts. 52(a) (1), (b) (1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 55 852(a) (1), (b) (1) (1964).
1
07Art. 52(b)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. S 852(b) (2) (1964).
"'SMCM 1969, para. 74d(3).
"' See United States v. Jones, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 33 C.M.R. 389 (1963). See also for a lengthy
discussion of this topic, Henson The Hung Jury: A Court-Martial Dilemma, 35 MIL. L. REv. $9
(1967).
1"5 See, e.g., Bellen, The Revolution in Military Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 1194, 1197 (1968).
1"'MCM 1969, para. 74d(3) provides in part:
If a reballot isproposed by any member as to a finding of guilty of an offense for
which the death penalty is mandatory by law, an additional ballot shall be taken
immediately. Otherwise, the question shall be determined on secret written ballot,
and a reballot shall be taken on a prior not guilty finding when a majority of the
members vote in favor thereof or on a prior guilty finding if more than one-third of
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United States v. Nash . . prior to the revision of the Manual. A final differ-
ence in the military is that unlike most civilian juries, the court itself sen-
tences the accused upon a finding of his guilt."'
In United States v. Jackson,"4 the Supreme Court held the section of the
Federal Kidnapping Act"' which provided that only in the event a defend-
ant requested a jury trial could the death penalty be imposed to be an
unconstitutional burden on the defendant's free exercise of the sixth
amendment guarantee of a jury trial. Congress in the Military Justice Act
of 1968 attempted to remedy a similar situation by providing in Article
18 that where the death penalty may be adjudged, the accused cannot
request to be tried by a military judge sitting alone."' This provision
leaves the accused with no choice ("choice" being the constitutional ob-
jection the Supreme Court found in the Jackson case) to make; he must
be tried by a military judge and a general court of not less than five
members." '
After the CMA holding in Tempia"s that prior to any interrogation, a
suspect must be advised of his right to counsel,"" the issue of whether a
serviceman is constitutionally entitled under the sixth amendment to
the services of an attorney during his special court-martial is raised. Ac-
cordingly, as one author pointed out, "after Tempia . . . a serviceman is
entitled to an appointed lawyer during interrogation but not in his spe-
cial court-martial trial.""'
The issue of whether or not a serviceman has a constitutional right to
the services of a qualified counsel has never been definitively answered by
the Supreme Court."' However, the issue has been considered by various
lower courts, both military and federal. In United States v. Culp, 122 the
CMA in effect held that the failure to provide an accused legally qualified
counsel at a trial by special court-martial is not incompatible with the re-
quirements of the sixth amendment."' In In re Stapely," a federal dis-
the members favor reballoting.
"'25 U.S.C.M.A. 550, 18 C.M.R. 174 (1955).
"
3 Art. 53, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 853 (1964).
114390 U.S. 570 (1968).
"'18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1964).
"'Art. 18, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (as amended 1968). See also H.R. REP. No. 1481, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968); S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1968), for a discussion
which reveals congressional intent on this subject.
117 Art. 16(1)(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 816(1)(A) (as amended 1968).
11" 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
". Id. at 637, 37 C.M.R. at 257.
"' Sherman, The Right to Competent Counsel in Special Courts-Martial, 54 A.B.A.J. 866
(1968). An accused at a general court-martial is entitled to the services of a legally qualified
counsel. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
"'lSee Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943).
12214 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
'"Id. at 216, 33 C.M.R. at 428. See also United States v. Donohtw, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 149, 39
C.M.R. 149 (1969), which held that the record of each general or special courts-martial convened
after April 7, 1969 must contain a recital of "accused's personal responses to direct questions in-
corporating each of the elements of Article 38(b), as well as his understanding of his entitlement
thereunder." Id. at 152, 39 C.M.R. at 152.
This holding will mean that under the Military Justice Act of 1968, the record must disclose
that the accused had actual knowledge of his right to the services of a lawyer. Compliance with
this provision will make it virtually impossible for an accused to later claim he had not waived
his right to counsel.




trict court held that "in proceedings before special courts-martial where
substantial criminal charges are to be tried . . . the availability of counsel
is a constitutional requirement.'. 2  The holding of Culp was adopted by
the Tenth Circuit when it affirmed a district court's holding2' in Kennedy
v. Commandant."7 Thus, prior to the determination by the Tenth Circuit
in Kennedy that the sixth amendment did not guarantee a serviceman
the right to the services of a legally qualified counsel, district courts in the
same circuit had differed diametrically on the issue.
Congress has taken from the Supreme Court the necessity of deciding
the constitutional and practical issues raised by the use of non-lawyer
counsel in the special courts-martial. One of the most important provi-
sions of the Military Justice Act of 1968 is Article 27 which gives to the
accused the right to representation by legally qualified counsel at a special
court-martial"' unless such counsel "cannot be obtained on account of
physical conditions or military exigencies.""..9 In one sense, this amendment
brings the military in line with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
because it requires the assignment of counsel to defendants that are unable
to afford one.' However, the Act goes further in that indigency of the
serviceman is not a prerequisite to the "right" to receive, free of charge,
the services of a qualified attorney. This provision does not in any way
limit the right of the military accused to obtain civilian counsel of his
own choice, at his own expense.
The impact of the requirement of lawyers at special courts-martial will
be affected by another important provision of the Military Justice Act.
Prior to the new Act, if a serviceman refused Article 15 punishment 3' and
elected to be tried by court-martial, he could not refuse a summary court-
martial. In all other instances, an accused could refuse to be tried by the
one officer summary court-martial and subsequently be tried by a special
125 246 F. Supp. at 321.
12 Kennedy v. Commandant, 258 F. Supp. 967 (D. Kan. 1966).
12 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967), habeas corpus denied, 389 U.S. 807 (1967). See also Harris
v. Ciccone, 290 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Mo. 1968); LeBallister v. Warden, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks,
247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965).
... The bill as passed by the House of Representatives would only have required the use of
legally qualified counsel in those instances where a bad-conduct discharge could be adjudged. 14
CONG. REc. H4466 (daily ed. June 3, 1968). However, as passed, this one section of the Act will
have a tremendous impact on the Army alone. First, based on 1968 figures, out of 43,769 special
courts-martial, 95% ended in convictions. 1968 UNITED STATES COURT OF MIL. APPEALS ANN.
REP. 23. Presumably, if adequate counsel is provided, there will be fewer guilty pleas and possibly
the conviction ratio will decrease. Secondly, since lawyers must now be furnished accuseds who
are tried by special court-martial (unless unobtainable on account of physical conditions or military
exigencies), the number of lawyers in the Army Judge Advocate General Corps will have to be sub-
stantially increased. Finally, if the constitutional rights of servicemen were jeopardized by their
representation by non-legal counsel, the protection of such rights will be substantially improved by
the guarantee of the right to legally qualified representation.
"29 Art. 27(c)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 827(c)(1) (as amended 1968).
(c) In the case of a special court-martial
(1) the accused shall be afforded the opportunity to be represented at the trial by
counsel having the qualifications prescribed under section 827(b) of this title (article
27(b)) unless counsel having such qualifications cannot be obtained on account of
physical conditions or military exigencies. If counsel having such qualifications cannot
be obtained, the court may be convened and the trial held but the convening authority
shall make a detailed written statement, to be appended to the record, stating why
counsel with such qualifications could not be obtained; . . ..
0 FED. R. CsrM. P. 44.
131 See notes 7-8 supra, and accompanying text.
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court. Article 20 of the new Act,"3 2 however, omits any reference to the
individual who has refused Article 15 punishment. This means that any
individual can now receive a special court-martial with the attendant
right to counsel. This provision is in line with congressional action to
eliminate the practical usage of the summary court-martial by the con-
vening authority, "thus assuring that no serviceman may be forced to
stand trial against his will in a court where the same man is judge and
jury, prosecutor, and defense counsel. '13
The special court itself has been changed dramatically under the new
Act to conform more closely with the federal judiciary. Article 16 now
provides that a special court-martial can also consist of (1) a military
judge and not less than three members, or (2) only a military judge if
before the court is assembled and after the accused knows the identity of
the judge and after consultation with his attorney, he requests in writing
a court composed of only a military judge and the judge approves." If
the latter provision is used extensively, it will not only substantially speed
up the court-martial procedure, but will also free many "line" officers
who would otherwise be detailed to courts-martial away from their other
duties. This provision will also raise the stature of the special court-
martial proceeding substantially to that of the federal bench because the
military judge must be a member of the bar of a federal court or of the
highest court of a state and must be certified as a military judge by the
Judge Advocate General. 5 Thus, every accused before a special court-
martial will be represented by a lawyer and has the option' to be tried
before a trained judge.
Rights of the Eighth Amendment. Two provisions of the eighth amend-
ment bear comment as to their applicability in the military judicial sys-
tem. The constitutional provision against the infliction of cruel and un-
usual punishments is carried forward statutorily by Article 55 of the
Code. This article provides that "[p]unishment by flogging, or by brand-
ing, marking, or tatooing the body, or any other cruel or unusual punish-
132 Art. 20, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (as amended 1968): "No person with respect to whom
summary courts-martial have jurisdiction may be brought to trial before a summary court-martial
if he objects thereto. If objection to trial by summary court-martial is made by an accused, trial
imay be ordered by special or general court-martial, as may be appropriate." (Emphasis added to
highlight the use of the permissive verb. This will possibly lead to fewer prosecutions of otherwise
punishable offenses.)
133S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 6 (1968).134 Art. 16, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (as amended 1968). The congressional intent behind this
provision is to make the military system more in line with Rule 23a of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that: "Cases required to be tried by a jury shall be so tried unless the
defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the
Government." This rule was constitutionally upheld in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
Congress optimistically notes that "[t]he adoption of . . . this procedure will result in an appre-
ciable reduction in both time and manpower normally expended in trials by courts-martial. The
vast majority of cases in which an accused pleads guilty . . . will probably be tried by a single
officer court." H.R. REP. No. 1481, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1968). See also 114 CONG. REC.
S12027 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1968).
'35Art. 26(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826(b) (as amended 1968).
16Art. 16, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (as amended 1968), now provides for the court to consist
of not less than three members (the sole composition under the old law) and a combination of a
military judge and not less than three members as well as the military judge sitting alone.
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ment, may not be adjudged by a court-martial or inflicted by any person
subject to this chapter.""
The excessive bail prohibition has no exact counterpart in the Code.
The practical problem presented by bail not being available was that prior
to the 1968 amendment it would not be uncommon for a convicted serv-
iceman to serve his entire sentence by the time his appeal was completed
with no real recourse available to him if his sentence was eventually re-
versed. It has been stated on numerous occasions by the CMA that the con-
stitutional guarantee of bail has not been extended to military personnel
pending appeal from a court-martial conviction.' In Levy v. Resor,'
the CMA held "immediate release of the person from any restraint" in
paragraph 21 (d) of the Manual'" reposed discretionary authority in the
commanding officer to release a convicted prisoner on his own recogni-
zance pending appeal, not just for release of persons acquitted.
Congress has amended the Code to provide for limited "bail" along the
lines set forth in the Levy case. In Article 57, Congress provided' that
"[o]n application by an accused who is under sentence to confinement
that has not been ordered executed, the convening authority ...may in
his sole discretion defer service of the sentence .. . .The deferment shall
terminate when the sentence is ordered executed. The deferment may be
rescinded at any time by the officer who granted it . . . ."' If this statu-
tory grant of discretion is exercised liberally by convening authorities, it
will provide the military serviceman convicted of a crime and sentenced,
a "bail" provision pending appeal without any bond or monetary equiva-
lent present or required, a right not available in the civilian judiciary.'"
III. PROCEDURAL CHANGES OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 1968
In keeping with its objective of "streamlining" the court-martial pro-
cedures to conform with procedures in United States District Courts,'"
Congress elevated the position of the law officer of a court-martial to that
of a military judge. Many of the military judge's new duties have analo-
gies in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and many are radical de-
partures from past practices. Permeating all of these changes is an attempt
by Congress to remove the military judiciary from under any control of
the authority who is responsible for convening the court-martial.
13 Art. 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855 (1964).
138Lcvy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967); United States v. Hangsleben,
8 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 24 C.M.R. 130 (1957); United States v. Bayhand, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 762, 21
C.M.R. 84 (1956). See also Noyd v. Bond, 285 F. Supp. 785 (D.N.M. 1968).
"917 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967).
140 MCM 1969, para. 21(d) provides that:
Upon notification from a trial counsel of the result of a trial . . . , a commanding
officer will take prompt and appropriate action with respect to the restraint of the
person tried. This action, depending on the circumstances, may involve the immediate
release of the person from any restraint, or the imposition of any necessary restraint
pending final action on the case.
"' This provision was not included by the House in their original bill, but was added by the
Senate.
14 Art. 57(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 857(d) (as amended 1968).
.. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 46(a), (c), (d).
1445. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (1968).
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The innovations of Article 26 contain some of the most radical changes
in the Code. The military judge must, as in the past, be qualified and cer-
tified by the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which he is a
member.4 ' However, although the convening authority will detail the
specific judge to the court-martial," that judge will be designated by, as-
signed by and will be directly responsible to the Judge Advocate General."7
This article specifically provides that "neither the convening authority
nor any member of his staff shall prepare or review any report concerning
the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the military judge..'.4 By this en-
actment, Congress intended to "enact into law the general principles of
the 'independent field judiciary' system already adopted administratively
by some of the armed services, while leaving to the services a desirable
degree of flexibility for implementing improvements in detail which may
be indicated by additional experience. '
To warrant his new stature, the military judge has been given many
new duties. Primarily, by acting alone at the request of the accused, the
military judge can be the general court-martial.. (as long as the death
penalty is not to be adjudged)'' and the special court-martial."' When
the court-martial is composed of a military judge acting alone, he "shall
determine all questions of law and fact arising during the proceedings and,
if the accused is convicted, adjudge an appropriate sentence... 5' When he
is acting as the judge with other members of the court, he "shall rule upon
all questions of law and all interlocutory questions arising during the pro-
ceedings."'' 4 Other technical amendments were made enlarging the ju-
dicial power of the military judge. He will now decide whether a continu-
ance is to be granted"'. and will also pass upon challenges for cause."
Under Article 39, the military judge is given the power to call the
court into session without the presence of the members for the purpose
of disposing of interlocutory motions which raise defenses and objections,
ruling upon other matters under the Code that may be legally ruled upon
by the military judge, holding the arraignment and receiving the pleas of
the accused if permitted by regulations, and performing other procedural
functions which do not require the presence of the other members of the
court. It is specifically provided that "[t]hese proceedings shall be con-
'45Art. 26(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826(b) (as amended 1968).
14'Art. 26(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (as amended 1968).
147Art. 26(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 926(c) (as amended 1968).
148 Id.
149S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1968).
'"Art. 19, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (as amended 1968).
"'5See notes 113-16 supra, and accompanying text.
1'2Art. 16(2) (C), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 816(2) (C) (as amended 1968).
'"Art. 51(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 851(d) (as amended 1968).
1 4 Art. 51(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 851(b) (as amended 1968). See also United States v.
Bridges, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 30 C.M.R. 96 (1961). Prior to the 1968 amendments, the law officer
of a general court and the president of the special court ruled on these motions.
'55Art. 40, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 840 (as amended 1968).
56 Art. 41 (a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (as amended 1968). See also United States v. Tal-
bott, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 446, 31 C.M.R. 32 (1961); United States v. Denin, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 17
C.M.R. 44 (1954); United States v. Adamiak, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 412, 15 C.M.R. 412 (1954).
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ducted in the presence of the accused, the defense counsel, and the trial
counsel and shall be made a part of the record.'.. 7
Although the 1968 amendment to the Code conforms the military
criminal procedure with Rules 12 and 17.1 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure,' 8 its importance goes much further. The practical effect
upon the military will be great. In a typical instance, when the issue arose
as to the admissibility of a confession, the members of the court had to
be excluded from the court room, though they were required to stay in
attendance. This meant that while sometimes lengthy arguments were
taking place, officers and enlisted men that had been taken from other
duties were doing nothing except waiting for a decision to be made.
Under the new procedure, this issue would be resolved prior to the as-
sembling of the court. If the objection were sustained, the issue would be
resolved. If the objection were overruled and the judge decided to admit
the confession, the issue of voluntariness would be litigated before the
full court.
One practice authorized under the old Code".. was that of the law
officer (the former military judge) assisting the court members in closed
session to put their findings into proper form. As the CMA noted in
United States v. Manual,' "the practice is fraught with danger. Com-
ments by the law officer may go beyond those very narrow limits of assist-
ance with legal form to become part of the court-martial's deliberation.''.
Congress has removed this danger by establishing more of a judge-jury
relationship. Now, the military judge "may not consult with the members
of the court except in the presence of the accused, trial counsel, and de-
fense counsel . . . .,
Another example of the new "streamlined" Code is Article 29, which
now provides that if new members are added to a special or general court-
martial after the trial has commenced due to the absence or excusal of a
member, the trial will proceed after a reading of the recorded evidence
has been made to the court in the presence of the judge, the accused and
counsel for both sides. If in a special court-martial, no verbatim record
has been maintained, the trial will proceed as though no evidence had
been introduced."3 If a military judge sitting alone is unable to continue,
a new judge must be selected pursuant to Article 16(1) (B) or (2) (C)
and the trial started anew unless a verbatim record has been kept.""
Article 45 has been amended to provide that if the regulations so pro-
vide, an accused may plead guilty to any charge or specification other
than one for which the death penalty may be imposed. Upon such plea
and acceptance by the court, a finding of guilty of the charge or specifi-
157Art. 39(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (as amended 1968).
15 See also United States v. Mullican, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 208, 21 C.M.R. 334 (1956); S. REP. No.
1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 10 (1968).
'"1Arts. 26, 39, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 826, 839 (1964).
16016 U.S.C.M.A. 357, 36 C.M.R. 513 (1966).
"' Id. at 360, 36 C.M.R. at 516.
"'2Arts. 26(e), 39(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 55 826(e), 839(b) (as amended 1968).
'"Arts. 29(b), (c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 55 829(b), (c) (as amended 1968).
1
6
4Art. 29(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. S 829(d) (as amended 1968).
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cation may be entered without the formalities of a vote. 5 This amend-
ment will conform the military to the civilian practice and eliminate the
time-consuming military procedure of requiring the court to assemble and
vote on the guilty plea.
By amending Article 66 and redesignating the old boards of review as
"Courts of Military Review," Congress has established a stronger inter-
mediate, independent appellate body within each service to review its
court-martial cases. Each Judge Advocate General is now authorized to
establish a Court of Military Review of one or more panels to be com-
posed of not less than three appellate military judges. A chief judge is also
designated for the court.'" Article 66 was further amended to prohibit a
member of a court of military review from in any way preparing or par-
ticipating in the submission of a fitness or efficiency report of any other
member."7
Article 69 has been amended by adding a new provision to authorize
the Judge Advocate General when reviewing the records of trials by
courts-martial to either vacate or modify the findings or sentence, or both,
of any courts-martial case which has been finally reviewed, but which has
not been reviewed by a Court of Military Review, because of newly dis-
covered evidence, fraud of the court, lack of jurisdiction over the accused
or the offense, or error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the ac-
cused.'" '
Perhaps the most vexatious and often criticized aspect of military jus-
tice has been the real or imagined influence of the commanding officer or
convening authority over the judicial process. Under the Code before it
was amended, this "influence" primarily took place in the convening au-
thority's broad discretion as to what cases he would deem worthy of con-
vening"' (a criticism which can be equally aimed at district attorneys),
and to "detail" members of the courts-martial,17 the law officer,'' and the
trial and defense counsel."' In a case involving influence over court action
the commander's chief legal advisor, the staff judge advocate,17 had de-
livered lectures on the responsibilities and duties of court members to an
entire command (which included five of seven members of the accused's
court). The CMA held " that references to inconsistent prior sentences
were not prejudicial to the accused and did not deprive him of a fair trial.
The dissent felt that the lectures were "intended to, and did, influence its
565 Art. 45 (b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845(b) (as amended 1968).
166 Art. 66(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (as amended 1968).
16 7Art. 66(g), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(g) (as amended 1968).
168Art. 69, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869 (as amended 1968).
'" Art. 22, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (as amended 1968) (general courts-martial); art. 23,




°Art. 25(d)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1964).
17' Art. 26, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1964).
17 Art. 27, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964).
173 Art. 34(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1964) provides that before the convening authority
can direct the trial of any charge by general court-martial, he must first refer it to his staff judge
advocate for consideration and advice.
.
74 United States v. Albert, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 111, 36 C.M.R. 267 (1966).
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hearers to adjudge harsher sentences . . . ."' In another instance of influ-
ence by the staff judge advocate, it was found on appeal that the staff
judge advocate had rendered poor efficiency reports on defense counsel
because of the zeal with which they had defended their clients.' To an
officer who depends on good efficiency reports for promotion to higher
grades, this type of influence and pressure could have a very real and
detrimental effect on the rights of the accused.
The Code attempts to deal with command influence in the form of lim-
itations on the commander's control. Article 22 (b) provides that if the
commanding officer is an "accuser" " he will be disqualified from con-
vening a general court-martial and it will have to be convened by a su-
perior competent authority.' s Articles 37 and 98 in combination make it
a court-martial offense for a convening authority or commanding officer
to "censure, reprimand or admonish the court or any member, law officer,
or counsel thereof, with respect to the finding or sentence adjudged by
the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his functions in
the conduct of the proceedings."1 9
The Military Justice Act of 1968 provides reform in this area of com-
mand influence, although it has been criticized as presenting only addi-
tional limitations on the commander's control rather than taking away
some of this control.80 First, and most important, the establishment of a
military judge corps independent of direct command influence has been
accomplished. As discussed previously,' Article 26 now provides for the
Judge Advocate General to designate military judges for detail by the
convening authority. In addition, with the accused being entitled in both
the special and general courts-martial to elect to be tried by a single mili-
tary judge, the convening authorities' control over the court members
will be minimized. If the military judge is removed from direct influence
by the convening authority, when he has appointed members on the court
with him, he will still be able to maintain an atmosphere of independence.
The impact of the amendment to Article 27 requiring qualified law-
yers as counsel in special courts-martial will probably mean a decrease in
attempts by convening authorities to influence court members, or else will
destroy the "myth" that there is widespread command influence to be
prohibited. Trained lawyers should be more able to recognize and object
'n' Id. at 115, 36 C.M.R. at 271. But see United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 110, 37 C.M.R.
374 (1967).
1,6 United States v. Kitchens, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 31 C.M.R. 175 (1961).
177,, [A] person who signs and swears to charges, any person who directs that charges nominally
be signed and sworn to by another, and any other person in the prosecution of the accused." Art.
1(9), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 801(9) (1964).
178 See also Arts. 23(b), 24(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 823(b), 824(b) (1964) for the same
provisos as to limitations on commanders' authority to convene special courts-martial and summary
courts-martial respectively.
'7 Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964). See discussion of this point in Haight, The Pro-
posed Military Justice Act of 1967: First Legislation for "Second Class" Citizens, 72 DicK L. REV.
92, 130-32 (1967).
'Sherman, Revised Military Code: A Qualified Assent, 5 TIAL 44 (Dec./Jan. 1968-1969).
'a' See notes 143-57 supra, and accompanying text.
'
8 Art. 16, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (as amended 1968).
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to adverse influence as well as prepare a better record for appeal setting
forth alleged objections.
The lawyers are now better protected from influence by their superiors
by an extensive amendment to Article 37. Article 37(a) was amended to
provide that general instructional or informational courses in military
justice solely for explaining the substantive and procedural aspects of
courts-martial are permissible. A new section was added to Article 37
which requires that in preparing efficiency reports, a commander or su-
perior may not "(1) consider or evaluate the performance of duty of any
such member as a member of a court-martial, or (2) give a less favorable
rating or evaluation of any member of the armed forces because of the
zeal with which such member, as counsel, represented any accused before
a court-martial.' ' .3 This gives needed protection to both non-lawyer mem-
bers of the court as well as the trial lawyers.
IV. CONCLUSION
In enacting the Military Justice Act of 1968, Congress has extensively
modernized a system of military justice that had not undergone substan-
tial statutory revision for almost three decades. The revisions enacted
were not easily accomplished, but were the work of various congressmen.
Moreover, they are the result of compromise on the parts of the military
departments and the civilian revisors. It is a realistic compromise between
the civilian federal rules and a strict disciplinarian system of the pre-
World War I and II days, recognizing the modern and judicially stream-
lined quality of the former while keeping in mind that the military ex-
igencies of the latter often demand different rules and standards.
In addition, the quality of military justice has undergone and is under-
going revision through the decisions of the CMA. With the adoption of
the requirements of Miranda by the Tempia court, the CMA brought the
military up to a plane with the Supreme Court's requirements as to what
is required at a minimum by the Constitution. The examination in Part
II of this Comment has given a summary of the constitutional rights
emanating from the Supreme Court and their analogous protection in the
military. A comparison of these cases leads to a possible conclusion that the
CMA will consider the Code to be controlling when it gives the accused
greater protection than the constitutional guarantee, and that it will con-
sider the Constitution as governing when the Code provides less protection.
Have the pronouncements of the CMA and the enactment of the Mili-
tary Justice Act of 1968 given the serviceman the "first-class legal service"
that President Johnson alluded to when he signed the Act into law? If
the military commanders and convening authorities comply with the law
in the spirit that it was meant to be complied with, further legislation
should not be required in the immediate future. The military services
should be given the opportunity to "live" with the law and try to correct
1 83 Art. 37(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837(b) (as amended 1968).
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any deficiencies that arose under the old Code and that were corrected
by the Military Justice Act of 1968.
Time and experience will have to be the judge as to the "first-class"
quality of the military justice, but the military, through the CMA, and
Congress through the Military Justice Act of 1968, have gone a long way
toward guaranteeing just that.
